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It is widely recognized that the value of environmental assets such as bio-
diversity, unique locations and the atmosphere may be hard to quantify. In
particular, option values, quasi-option values and non-use values have been the
subject of extensive discussion. We propose here an evaluation of environmental
assets based on the option value or shadow price associated with intertemporal
welfare maximization under conditions of uncertainty about the future prefer-
ences. We show that these values can provide powerful motives for conservation
of the goods, and are under certain conditions equivalent to a reduction in the
discount rate to be applied to future benefits. We also show that the option
value can be bounded below by a function of the degree of risk aversion and pa-
rameters of the probability distribution governing the uncertainty about future
preferences.
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1 Introduction
The valuation of environmental resources such as biodiversity, current climate con-
ditions, or complex ecological systems, has attracted attention for several decades.
Amongst the earliest studies of these issues were Weisbrod [14], Krutilla [10], Cic-
chetti and Freeman [3], Arrow and Fisher [1] and Henry [8] [9]. Subsequent works
that built on these contributions include Bishop [2], Smith [12], Krutilla and Fisher
[6], Fisher and Hanneman [5] and Mitchell and Carson [11]. In this literature, a key
question was how to allow for irreversibility, i.e., for the fact that certain options have
the property that if they are once foreclosed, then they are never again available. The
destruction of unique assets such as an historic building or an ecosystem, or the ex-
tinction of a species, have this characteristic. If we decide not to keep the building
or the ecosystem or the species, then we can never subsequently change our minds.
In contrast, if we decide not to build a new building, then we can usually change
our minds at a subsequent date. If we are uncertain about our future preferences,
then this possibility provides a type of insurance. This insurance is not available
if the irreversible decision is carried out. Consequently the decision not to destroy
a building or a species, or in general not to take an irreversible action, has to be
credited with an option value or insurance value which reflects the value of keeping
the alternative available for possible exercise in the future. In the current climate of
concern about sustainability as an objective for environmental policy (see Solow [13],
the Brundtland Report [15]) there is particular sensitivity to the thorough analysis
of irreversible decisions with respect to the environment. Solow [13] argues that an
important element in a formal interpretation of sustainability is an attempt to allow
for the possibility that future generations may have very different preferences from
ours about environmental assets. This possibility is modeled formally here and is at
the heart of our analysis.
A concept related to option value is that of non-use value. Existence values and
bequest values have been analyzed as categories of non-use values. There may be
environmental goods for which we have no immediate economic use, whose existence
we nevertheless value. Presumably the existence of certain species are in this category:
the Californian condor, the spotted owl, and various snails and fish come to mind.
There is no sense in which we can currently use these species: possibly one could
argue that the condor and the owl have value as consumption items for those who
make the effort required to view them, but few people come into this category, and
one doubts that this is a significant issue with the snail.
These two concepts - option value and non-use value - seem to overlap. Many
goods which exemplify one also exemplify the other. At the same time, there are no
doubt differences. Non-use values may stem in some degree from ethical considera-
tions, from a recognition that a species has a right to exist even if humanity places
no direct value on it. But one suspects that behind many non-use valuations there
lurks an option value: many non-use valuations stem from an unstated belief that at
some date in the future and under certain conditions our preferences may change and
a use value may emerge.
Our aim in this paper is to develop a simple continuous-time stochastic dynamic
framework within which we can derive a formula for option values. This framework is
derived from that introduced in Dasgupta and Heal [4]. We do this using a dynamic
optimization model in which current planners are uncertain about the preferences
of future generations, and wish to respect the possibility of their having a stronger
preference for an environmental good. The model therefore admits a possibility of
a change in preferences at some future date that will increase the valuation of an
environmental good. This possibility of a change in the valuation of the environmental
good in the future gives rise to an increase in the shadow price associated with the
constraint on its availability: we interpret this change in the shadow price as an option
or non-use value. We are able to calculate a bound on this value and show how it
depends on the society's degree of risk aversion, on the parameters of the probability
distribution governing the possibility of a change in preferences, and on the intensity
of the possible shift in preferences. We are also able to show that this value is in a
certain sense equivalent to a reduction in the discount rate to be applied to benefits
from the environmental good in the future (Proposition 2).
The motivation for the existence of an option value in our model - the possibility of
a shift in preferences in the future - is in the tradition established by Weisbrod [14] and
the earliest writes on this subject. Mitchell and Carson [11] in a recent survey state
that "option value is the amount that people will pay for a contract which guarantees
them the right to purchase a good for a specified price at a specified point in the future,
and may be thought of as a risk premium to compensate for uncertainty about future
taste, income or supply." However, the framework within which we approach this is
new. We study a continuous time dynamic optimization problem with the possibility
of a stochastic change in preferences, and analyze the impact of the possibility of a
change in preferences towards an environmental good. In particular, we ask how the
uncertain possibility of a preference shift affects consumption rates and shadow prices
for the environmental good. We compare the shadow price of the good in the presence
of a possible future preference shift with that without such a possibility, and argue
that the difference is an option value. In the words of Mitchell and Carson cited
above, it is certainly "a risk premium to compensate for uncertainty about future
taste, income or supply." It is not however "the amount that people will pay for a
contract which guarantees them the right to purchase a good for a specified price
at a specified point in the future", but rather the amount that they are willing to
pay today for a unit of the good that can be held into the future. This approach
succeeds in integrating the concept of option value into the mainstream economic
literature on valuation by interpreting it as the difference between the shadow price
of an irreplaceable asset calculated in two alternative frameworks, one with and one
without the possibility of a change in preferences towards the asset in the future.
2 Optimal Conservation Decisions with Uncer-
tain Future Preferences
2.1 The Basic Framework
Consider an environmental good of which there is at time t a stock St. This good
may be consumed at a rate ct, so that the rate of change of the stock is given by
dSt
 -Z , m
Feasibility requires that 5f > 0 Vt. At time zero society derives utility from the
consumption of this good according to the function u (ct) which is assumed to be
increasing, twice continuously differentiate and strictly concave. There is a possibil-
ity that at a future date which we shall denote T the utility of consuming this good
will change from u (ct) to U (ct) where U (ct) > u (ct) Vct. In fact it is appropriate to
think of U as very much bigger than u for all consumption levels. U is also assumed
to be increasing, twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave. The date T
at which there is a switch from u to U is a random variable with marginal density
ujf, so that u>t > 0 and /0°°^t < 1- We permit inequality here as we wish to be able
to recognize a positive probability that the change in preferences will never occur.
We can think of the switch from u to U as representing a change of tastes from one
generation to another: we are therefore envisaging the current generation as being
uncertain about the preferences of its successors and wishing to allow for the fact
that they may value more highly the environmental good.
The basic idea, then, is that there is a possibility of a change in preference that
will lead to a great increase in the valuation of the environmental good. It is not
certain that there will be such a change, nor do we know when it might occur. The
question that we pose is: How does this possibility affect our use of the resource and
our valuation of the resource?
In order to answer this question, we need first to formulate an ancillary problem.
Following Dasgupta and Heal [4] we define
W (ST) = Max ff U (ct) e~6^-TUt
subject to /<£° ctdt = ST
W (ST) is thus state valuation function which values the stock ST remaining at
time T when the change in preferences occurs. Here of course 8 is a discount rate
applied to future utilities: for a discussion of the appropriateness of discounting in
this context see Heal [7]. Given this, we may now define an overall problem:
Maximize /0°° uT {/0T u (ct) e~6tdt + e-STW {ST)} dT
subject to St— —ct and St > OVt.
The interpretation of this problem is as follows. The date T at which preferences may
change is a random variable. For any particular T, the utility of a consumption path
is given by the expression in the parentheses {}. We then take the expectation of
this over all possible values of T as the maximand. In other words, we maximize the
expected discounted value of utility derived from consuming the environmental good,
where the expectation is taken with respect the probability distribution governing
an increase in preference for the environmental good. By integrating by parts, the
problem (2) can be reformulated as
Maximize /0°° e~St {u (ct) Qt + ^ tW (St)} dt
• (3)
subject to St— —ct and St > 0V£.
where flt = /t°° uTdr,
2.2 Consumption Rates and the Option Value
In order to solve problem (3) we introduce a shadow price or adjoint variable on the
stock Stm. this will be denoted pt. Then a necessary condition for a consumption path
and a shadow price path to solve (3) is that ct and pt satisfy the following equations1:
t=pt
Pt —Opt = -LOtW
where a prime denotes the first derivative of a function of a single variable with respect
to its argument. A little manipulation allows us to condense (4) into the intuitive
single equation
n + \ X ) % ()
ct [ u J ytt
where n is the elasticity of the marginal utility of the function u with respect to
consumption, i.e., n = ^-r < 0 where the double prime denotes the second derivative
of u with respect to its argument. (5) tells us that the rate of change of consumption
depends on the discount rate, the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and
the expectation of the increase in the marginal valuation of consumption conditional
on the change in preferences not having yet occurred. (^ is of course the probability
of the change in preferences occurring at t given that it has not previously occurred.)
LFor mathematical details, see Dasgupta and Heal.
In order to interpret (5) it is helpful to consider a conventional optimal resource
use problem with no possibility of a change in preferences. This problem can be
formulated as
Maximize /0°° u (ct) e~6tdt . .
subject to /0°° ctdt < So
For this problem (6) the equivalent to equation (5) is:
4 = 6 (7)
A comparison of (5) and (7) shows clearly the effect of the possible change in pref-
erences for the environmental good. We expect that u — W < 0, so that in moving
from (7) to (5) we lower the effective discount rate. This is to be expected, and is
stated formally in Proposition 2 below: the possibility of an increase in our prefer-
ences for the good in the future makes us more future-oriented in our selection of a
consumption rate. First we note:
Remark 1 On a path satisfying (5) the initial level of consumption is less than the
initial level of consumption on a path satisfying (7).
Proof. Denote the paths satisfying (5) and (7) by ct (5) and ct (7) respectively.
We know that c (5) /c(5) >c (7) /c(7) . Hence Co (5) < Co (7). This follows from the
fact that both paths satisfy the same integral constraint on consumption*
The consumption profile is more "sustainable", at least in the sense of showing
less inequality between generations, on the path with the possibility of a change in
preferences. We can now assert:
Proposition 2 The possibility of an increase in the valuation of the environmental
good, as represented by a shift from u to U at a date T with distribution ujt, leads to a
more conservative initial usage policy for the good and a more egalitarian consumption
pattern over time. The possibility of a future change in preferences is equivalent to
the reduction of the discount rate 8 in the non-stochastic optimal use problem (6) by
the time-dependent amount \ u ~V
In more informal terms, we have shown that the conditions that give rise to an
option value, also lead to a more conservative depletion policy. Next we study the
effect of these conditions on the shadow price of the environmental good.
2.3 Option Values and Shadow Prices
We assume in this section the utility function u has a constant elasticity of marginal
utility with respect to consumption. This, plus specific assumptions about the dis-
tribution ujf, allows us to characterize partially the change in the shadow price of the
6
environmental good as a result of the introduction of the possibility of a preference
change. We shall identify this change in the shadow price as the option value. In this
case if we take the certain problem whose solution satisfies (7) then it is routine to
show that
^ =& (S)
where a bar over a variable denotes its value along a solution path to the certain
problem. We cannot obtain a similar formula for CQ on the path satisfying (5): however
we can obtain a bound. We assume that the distribution ut is a Poisson distribution
with parameter A so that ^ = A \/t. In this case (5) becomes
(9)
With our strict concavity assumption on preferences, both u and W rise over
time as the remaining stock and the level of consumption both fall. Define b =
inff < u 'Cto~ . * *> > and assume that there exists a strictly negative number e suchL « [ct) J JO
that b < e < 0. This would certainly be true if for any St and the associated ct along
a path satisfying (9) W' were strictly greater than u . If U is much greater than w,
this is likely to be the case. Hence
u W' 1
(10)
Letting 6 + bX = 6* < 6, and applying remark 1 above, we know that
^ - S o * *
c0 <
Comparing (8) and (11) we see that CQ <CQ. Assume that f£° u>t = 1, so that the
preference change will occur with certainty at some finite date. Let po and p0 be
the initial shadow prices on the paths satisfying (5) and (7) respectively, i.e., the
initial shadow prices of the environmental good with and without the possibility of a
preference change. Then we can assert:
Proposition 3 Assume that f£° wt = 1, and that the utility functions have constant
elasticity of marginal utility. Then the initial shadow prices of the environmental good
with (po) and without (p0) the possibility of a shift of preferences towards the good in
the future satisfy the inequality
po > u [ > po=u [ — — (12)
If u (c) = lnc, then the change in shadow price or option value satisfies the following
inequality:
p0 v v
More generally, if u (c) = — c77, n < 0, then
/ c \ V-l
(14)
Proof. The inequality (12) follows from (4) and (8). One verifies (13) by noting
that if u (c) = lnc, then u (~SQS j = l/5o^ = po- (14) follows from the fact that
u(c) = -c-» implies u = -V (=f*v'~* v nn'Vn ~ '' " ' " J
3 Conclusions
We have analyzed the problem of making irreversible decisions is a situation where
preferences may change in the future, after the irreversible decision has been made.
Following Weisbrod [14], Krutilla [10], Arrow and Fisher [1], and Henry [8], we have
used this as a framework for thinking about the conservation of environmental as-
sets such as biodiversity, unique locations, ecosystems, the atmosphere, etc. We have
worked with a model in which there is a possibility of a quantum increase in the in-
tensity of preference for environmental goods at an unknown future date. The present
generation does not know the preferences of its successors and wishes to allow for the
possibility of them having a greater valuation of the environmental good. Solow [13]
interprets the desirability of sustainability as arising from an obligation to leave our
successors the opportunity to be as well off as we are. On this interpretation, policies
oriented towards sustainability must be based on a recognition of the possibility that
our successors may have different preferences from us. Hence the approach here may
be a building block towards a broader analysis of sustainability.
We have studied the change in the shadow price of the environmental asset as a
result of the possibility of a preference change and identified this with the concept of
option value. We were able to find a lower bound on this which increases with A, the
exponent of the Poisson distribution describing the possibility of a preference change.
An increase in the degree of risk aversion 77, measured by the elasticity of marginal
utility, also increases the lower bound on the option value. This lower bound also
depends in an increasing way on 6, the lower bound on the increase in the marginal
valuation of the good along an optimal use path. Note that if the increase in the
marginal valuation were always equal to its lower bound - i.e., b = < u \ ; j ~ ( ^ ^St' > Vt
- then the lower bound on the change in shadow price would in fact be equal to the
change in shadow price, i.e., would be an exact estimate.
In order to asses the potential importance of the effects that we have analyzed, it
is instructive to review the numerical size of the change in the shadow price resulting
from some possible parameter values. Consider for simplicity the case of 77 = — 1, so
that the utility function is logarithmic, and let 8 = 0.08, b = — 1 and A = 0.05. This is
a very conventional discount rate, and a relatively small lower bound on the increase
in marginal valuation 6, implying that W' is always at least twice u . Then from (13)
we see that po = 8po/5. The possibility of a preference change raises the shadow price
by at least 37.5%. Halving the discount rate from 10% to 5% would double this lower
bound, to 75%. Halving b would of course halve the lower bound. If instead we take
77 = —2, then for the same parameter values we have po = 512 p0 /27. Clearly the
orders of magnitude involved are quite large, and are sensitive to the degree of risk
aversion.
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